Introduction
Despite tremendous progress in improving their safety performance, modern healthcare systems still have a long way to go compared to other high-risk, low-error industries such as banking or air transportation. To that end, it has been proposed that adoption of the aviation industry's high-reliability models (HRMs) by healthcare systems may help reduce the occurrence of medical errors. These HRMs are based on in-depth analyses of failure modes and are characterized by their inherent focus on team approaches and the commitment to identifying often complex solutions to existing problems [1] . Within the highly complex environment of modern healthcare, the process of improving patient safety (PS) is certainly a long and arduous journey. This chapter is intended to serve as a framework to the broader discussion of strategies to improve PS outcomes. The overarching themes of this book series revolve around continually institutionalizing and further refining a culture of safety within modern healthcare systems.
The emphasis on both individual and team excellence, backed by well-established, systembased support structures and mechanisms, provides the most optimal substrate for further enhancements in PS [2, 3] . The organizational quest for improving PS revolves around embracing continuous self-improvement, effective change management, realistic goal setting, and rewarding positive individual and team behaviors [4, 5] . Only when all of the above elements are present in "correct proportions" and harmoniously interact to produce synergies can our healthcare systems enter the state of sustainable culture of safety. The goal of the institutional commitment to patient safety [13, 14] . Within this complex "value" equation, hospital finances and reputation can also be significantly affected [15] .
Increasingly, both government payers and private health insurance companies decline to reimburse healthcare systems and providers for the care involving, or resulting from, such lapses in patient safety (or complications thereof). The financial burden of managing various adverse event-related complications is often substantial-and frequently exceed the numerical costs of managing the initial problem for which the patient was hospitalized. Given the trend toward payer cost-avoidance and value-driven approaches, now more than ever, those additional expenses are being shifted toward hospitals and providers. Along the same lines, there is growing impetus by both the public and third-party payers to provide reimbursement based on outcomes and quality of care, and not necessarily for "work performed." Furthermore, payers are now looking toward financial models that consider not only the patient outcomes but provider-and institution-specific outcomes as well [16, 17] . Within the value-based healthcare paradigm, unusually high wound infection rates or failures to use (or even document the use) of best-practice therapies such as prophylactic antibiotics, pre-procedural beta-blockers, and appropriate DVT prophylaxis are now becoming publically reported data and potential quality metrics for which insurance payers might withhold or adversely adjust payments [18, 19] . In some situations, failure to use or document "best practices" that are focused on patient safety can even result in institutional financial and nonfinancial penalties [20, 21] .
Compensation and incentive models at the level of physician practices and individual physicians are also being linked to outcomes that consider patient safety [22] . In addition, as previously mentioned, in the era of transparency and public reporting of outcome data, patients can now seek out hospitals-and even specific providers-that have the best outcomes across multiple domains of performance, from complications to hospitalization lengths of stay and patient safety event rates [23, 24] . Hence, an obvious reason for such growing interests in PS is that it makes good business sense. Furthermore, public reporting of key clinical metrics and safety indicators has transformative effect on institutions, providers, and patients [25] .
Finally, adverse events often result in medical-legal discussions regarding "deviations from the standard of care" or even "malpractice" and can result in considerable financial consequences for all involved stakeholders. In brief, fostering patient safety is the right thing to do! In addition, as our collective experience in achieving a culture and climate of safety grows, organizations should liberally utilize this growing body of knowledge to create and reinforce a framework for delivering safer care, establishing process improvement plans, and emphasizing "best practices" and evidence-based institutional guidelines [26] [27] [28] . The primary goal of the chapters in this volume of Vignettes in Patient Safety is to provide a solid conceptual foundation for accomplishing a truly formidable task of providing the highest quality care for our patients while ensuring that treatments take place efficiently and safely. As we concentrate our efforts on some of the pressing challenges and barriers to achieving a culture of safety, we should carefully and humbly follow Bagian et al. [29] in the realization that patient safety is a continuous learning process and that in order to "develop and deploy a patient safety program," we must first accept that we "can't fix what [we] don't know…."
Focus on challenges
There are several important reasons why challenges remain in the general area of patient safety. Starting with deeply ingrained institutional cultural patterns that are exceedingly difficult to change [4, 30] , the immense number of potential ways and contributing factors that may be associated with unintentional harm is beyond any one person's ability to effectively comprehend or influence, either directly or indirectly [31] [32] [33] . Lack of awareness, combined with inadequate education and training, continues to create highly unpredictable "blind spots" within the patient safety paradigm [34, 35] . With increasing emphasis on the importance of the patient as an instrumental factor in the overall healthcare safety equation [2, 36] , potential exists for both beneficial and harmful effects of the added complexity of the resultant "safety matrix." For example, a patient may be able to help identify the correct anatomic site before he or she undergoes an invasive procedure, yet the same patient may communicate incorrect medication dosage for their regularly prescribed antihypertensive.
Among potential "safety blind spots" mentioned above, team communication and the patient "handoff" process are associated with the greatest risk of healthcare associated errors. The "handoff" or handover process (HOP) refers to the formal procedure of transferring the clinical care of a patient from a departing provider to an incoming provider and involves targeted transfer of critical information, oversight responsibility, and decision-making authority [37, 38] . Also called the "transition of care" process, the HOP may involve various time schedules (e.g., shift based, daily, weekly) and provider levels, further increasing the potential for miscommunication and potential error(s). The HOP is also the standard operating procedure in both inpatient and outpatient medical settings, as well as during transitions between those two realms [39] [40] [41] [42] . The HOP is highly variable and often dependent upon the provider's level of training, the scope of responsibility, area of specialty, and time constraints associated with daily workload [43] [44] [45] . Yet, the HOP is often overlooked as a source of miscommunication that potentiates adverse outcomes [46] [47] [48] . Of note, in both 2003 and 2011, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) mandated a decrease in the number of continuous duty hours for house officers [49] . Training programs have acclimated to shorter shift hours from the more classic long call demands. Therefore, there are many more HOPs to cover the increased number of shifts [48, [50] [51] [52] . Although the struggle to balance resident work hours and the continuity of care is likely to persist [51] , some have suggested that providing "protected handoff environment," free of distractions and based on predetermined, standardized communication guidelines and EMR-based solutions, may help reduce HOP-related errors [52, 53] . Given this new reality, the healthcare industry must learn from areas where HRMs are the norm, not the exception [1, 54] .
Colvin et al. [37] examined the HOP in the intensive care unit (ICU), where errors or omissions of important history can greatly impact critically ill patients. Given the high acuity of care being provided in the ICU, the overall situational complexity makes the HOP extremely important and closely enmeshed with a broad range of PS considerations. Types of communication breakdowns identified by Colvin et al., during the HOP included (a) critical content omissions, (b) sharing of inaccurate or conflicting information, (c) the provision of irrelevant or distracting information, (d) failure to discuss anticipated problems or plans, (e) "illegible or unclear" HOPs, and (f) failure to communicate rationale behind overnight decisions [37] . The authors highlight the lack of standardization and education regarding the HOP across the healthcare system. Published in 2005, a survey of the Internal Medicine Sub-Internship Clerkship Directors based on input from 125 US Medical Schools showed that <10% of institutions taught students how to perform HOPs in a formal didactic setting [55] . Given the above factors, and the associated inconsistencies in the HOP across organizations, an urgent action is required to rectify this state of affairs and ensure that both training and implementation of HOP-related skills are standardized.
Other barriers to effective teamwork in the healthcare setting involve psychosocial and organizational structure-related factors encountered in the workplace. Weller et al. [56] reviewed roadblocks to communication in the setting of multidisciplinary caregiver teams. The success of information sharing is a primary predictor for the overall performance of any team in any workplace. It was found that the "hierarchical structure" in medicine may be associated with poorer safety outcomes. Less experienced individuals, such as medical students and junior residents, may lack confidence when reporting patient concerns or diagnostic information, potentially withholding important data "out of concern for being wrong." This pyramidal organizational style can contribute to increased risk of adverse events across a broad range of settings, from medicine to aviation or banking industries. As noted by Malcolm Gladwell in a well-known example from aviation, disastrous consequences may result when junior pilots fail to challenge misguided decisions of more veteran pilots [56, 57] . Areas of systemic vulnerability are more likely to become exposed (or exaggerated) when quick decisions must be made during high-risk situations or procedures [2, 58] . In an important study of episodes of "escalation of care" on surgical wards, failure at any step of the "escalation" process (e.g., from nurse to junior resident to senior resident to attending/consultant) has the potential to result in increased morbidity and mortality [59] . Healthcare systems in general have relatively little redundancy of resources, and when compared to other "high-risk" fields like aviation and the military, the ability to compensate for any systemic error (e.g., dual tasking, debriefing, "backup behaviors") is very limited [59] .
Additional concerns regarding patient safety pertain to the physical plant and/or the geographical location of the healthcare team in relation to specific "points of care" [60] [61] [62] . Many hospitals and other healthcare facilities have expanded or branched to many communities, effectively making geography a barrier to direct communication [63, 64] . Outcomes resulting from the complex interplay between variables related to regionalization of care can become problematic when staffing levels fail to adequately match local institutional needs [65] [66] [67] . At times, the ability to effectively schedule and coordinate various teams for rounds, meetings, patient care coordination, case management discussions, family meetings, etc., are limited by the physical separation of facilities and stretching of the same resources across multiple sites. As a result, poorly organized meetings and more random encounters occur, resulting in potentially impaired transfers of vital patient information from provider to provider [56] .
Another challenging area that affects patient care and safety is the evolution of the electronic medical record (EMR). Advantages of EMR include improved legibility, completeness of record, direct transmission, security and safety of information transfer, and access to large volumes of information [68] . However, the mere presence of EMR does not guarantee enhanced patient outcomes or safety. The built-in safety features like order sets, drug interactions, electronic verification and timing of results/studies, meaningful use, coding, etc., are only helpful and effective if the provider adopts and accesses the system proficiently. Significant education is required to reduce any potential barriers to proper EMR utilization. Among notable "stumbling blocks" in this domain are typing proficiency, motivation and personal initiative, comfort level with workarounds, and onthe-job practice. Other system challenges include physical space, ergonomics, electricity, wireless connectivity, and interinstitutional integration of data [68] . Thus, both personal and systemic limitations of EMRs have the potential to affect the quality and timeliness of patient care.
Human factors: individuals, teams, and institutional culture
Within the area of patient safety, human factors feature prominently as direct or indirect contributors to adverse events [69, 70] . A broad spectrum of variables to be considered here includes behavioral, cognitive, sensory, and other personal modulators of individual performance [70] [71] [72] [73] . In their interim assessment of progress achieved following the landmark To Err Is Human report, Leape and Berwick point out that although the overall "… efforts are affecting safety at the margin, their overall impact is hard to see in national statistics…" [74] . This was one reason for the implementation of duty hour restrictions for residents in 2011; however, in 2017, the pendulum has swung back toward a more "hybrid on-call model" partly because the restriction on hours which was supposed to help prevent errors related to fatigue perhaps did not account for system errors in handoffs [75] [76] [77] .
Increasing awareness of the importance of team and system errors shifted the "safety focus" from individual providers to clinical teams, patient care units, and institutions in general [78, 79] . A recent study nicely demonstrated that great majority of patient safety events related to unintentional surgical item retention involved team or system errors and that isolated human factors were involved in fewer than 10% of instances [3] . The complexity of the overall system-wide consideration is further highlighted by the fact that two or more safety omissions were involved in >52% of cases of retained surgical items in the same study [3] . A less recognized aspect of patient safety, yet perhaps the most dramatic, and one that can have lasting deleterious effects on all stakeholders when it occurs, is selfharm in the general hospital setting. Inpatient suicide is the second most common sentinel event (12% of all sentinel events) according to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, yet research on this is sparse [80] . As we read each chapter in the Vignettes in Patient Safety, it becomes apparent how important effective teamwork and institutional system design are to ensuring that our healthcare facilities and teams are setup for success [79, 81] .
A final obstacle to improving safety in healthcare is the very culture of healthcare itself.
In the high-risk environment of medicine, a tendency may emerge for quality review processes to employ "culture of blame" instead of a "just culture" or other, more collaborative models [82] [83] [84] [85] . Many healthcare professionals are concerned about corrective and punitive actions related to unintentional errors. This fear of failure can lead to under-reporting of medical errors and therefore diminished ability to prevent future correction/remediation for the individual physician as well as their peers [86, 87] . Learning from mistakes is not a common adage that is comforting to a physician. Fear of error should not be thought of as an individual's failure but rather a "collective responsibility" for future education and improvement [82] .
Overcoming challenges: embracing effective solutions and evidencebased interventions
Each new patient safety event represents a setback, and many such setbacks occur each and every day. Despite this, it is our hope that the number of patient safety events will show a downward trajectory as the collective awareness of various mechanisms and risks involved improves. We believe that the ultimate goal of "zero incidence" can, and will, be achieved. After all, each setback is an opportunity to learn, self-reflect, and ultimately improve. The complexity of the healthcare industry, with multiple distinct specialties that deal with diverse patient populations, is far greater than that of most other industries. This may be one of the reasons why HRMs that work so well for the aviation industry are only the beginning of a long and challenging process of healthcare safety improvement. Further, the limited scope of the current efforts to improve patient safety, including lack of a truly comprehensive nationwide monitoring and surveillance system, severely hinders the progress of large-scale efforts in this critically important area [74] .
Given the above considerations, as well as the heterogeneity of factors that contribute to patient safety events, our editorial team felt it was critically important to direct the reader to some of the most prominent recent studies in patient safety. Instead of reverting to the traditional collection of "classics," we opted to limit our search to the past 5 years (2012-2017) and present information that may help refocus and redirect global patient safety efforts. These articles are summarized in Table 1 . Among the most important topics reviewed here are interventions centered on hospital-acquired infections, surgical checklists, patient handoffs, other human factors/team considerations, and the use of EMR to reduce errors. In addition, an outline of recommendations made by the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) is provided in Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by improving the usability of electronic health record systems: recommendations from AMIA Report outlining recommendations from the task force dedicated to addressing errors associated with the use of electronic health records (EHR); AMIA = American Medical Informatics Association
After comprehensively reviewing and analyzing existing literature, in combination with expert-based experiences, the AMIA task force proposes 10 recommendations regarding HER use and human factors, policy, industry, and clinical practice. These recommendations are further outlined in The authors found substantial synergies between existing studies, with seven out of ten parameters common to the three source studies becoming significantly associated with RSI risk in the meta-analysis. These factors included operative blood loss >500 mL, incorrect or absent surgical count(s), more than one sub-procedure, more than one surgical team, longer duration of surgery, and the presence of unexpected intraoperative factor(s) Morello The original study [104] demonstrated that longer duration of surgery, safety variances, and incorrect surgical counts all independently elevated RSI risk. Of note, the study also demonstrated that lack of documentation was associated with RSIsan indirect validation of patient safety documentation compliance efforts.
The post-hoc analysis demonstrated that most RSI events involved team or system errors and that more than 50% of occurrences featured two or more safety omissions-an indirect validation of the "Swiss cheese" model of patient safety Promoting a culture of safety as a patient safety strategy: a systematic review
The authors performed a metaanalysis of 33 source studies, focusing data extraction on "… health care workers practicing in inpatient settings…" and "…change in patient safety culture or climate after a targeted intervention"
Team-based approaches, executive and interdisciplinary rounding, and the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program have been found to be effective in improving clinician and staff perceptions of patient safety culture
Studies are listed alphabetically, sorted by the first author's last name. OR = Odds ratio; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval; SBAR = Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation Table 1 . Summary of selected studies on patient safety and related topics, published since 2012. 
Area of opportunity AMIA recommendations

Summation and future directions
In the ever-changing healthcare environment, one fundamental principle must remain constant-universal and steadfast commitment to the continued improvements in PS, with corresponding assurances to those who literally entrust their lives to healthcare institutions and systems around the world. Steps to improve PS, as outlined in this chapter and throughout the Vignettes, include (a) recognizing current patient safety issues (and patterns); (b) dynamically modifying systems, education, and training related to patient safety; (c) educating healthcare professionals on the significance of PS models and the importance of patient safety culture; and (d) developing collaborations with all stakeholders, including patients, to decrease the incidence of errors and never events [2, 108] . Successful PS paradigms must recognize that humans are fallible and that mistakes in medicine will likely continue to be made, even if our current efforts decrease adverse events by 1-2 orders of magnitude [109] . Whenever identified, "slip-ups" or "near misses" should be promptly identified and addressed with appropriate training, successful communication, and safety checks. Additionally, patient safety systems must foster a culture of safety that emboldens communication, trust, and honesty [110] . This paradigm should include a universal understanding that most sentinel events are not a product of a single individual acting in isolation, but rather of multiple cofactors combining simultaneously and unpredictably to result in a patient safety occurrence.
There is growing evidence that institutions able to ensure appropriate staffing and balanced workloads can positively affect patient safety, lengths of stay, and organizational finances [111] [112] [113] [114] . A retrospective observational study in a large tertiary medical center found that nurse staffing below target levels was associated with increased mortality [115] . Another prospective, randomized, controlled study showed that interns were less likely to make serious medical errors when they worked shorter shifts [116] . There is also data to suggest that patient mortality and resident well-being both improved after the American College of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) reduced resident work hours in 2003 [117] .
Communication errors between providers can adversely affect PS during routine care and even more so during emergency care and in code situations. Training and new processes have been put into place to minimize communication errors. It is also hoped that EMRs will decrease some of the communication errors resulting from poor handwriting. Diagnostic errors could be due to a wrong, missed, or delayed diagnosis. Since a missed or delayed diagnosis can lead to significant downstream costs, implications on both patient well-being and financial expenditures can be dramatic [118] . Encouraging providers to improve their metacognition (or "thinking about thinking") and awareness of overconfidence can be helpful in reducing diagnostic errors [119] . Recently, there has also been an increased emphasis on systemic changes to minimize diagnostic errors, such as computerbased decision support tools. However, these can be associated with some unintended consequences. These tools can be time-consuming, and they can lead to unnecessary downstream testing. There is also a concern they could lead to provider "deskilling" over time [119] .
Over the past two decades, the emergence of EHR/EMR led to a significant paradigm change in healthcare. In addition to diagnostic, communication, and other types of medical errors our systems have grown accustomed to addressing, health IT errors have emerged as a category of patient safety events requiring increasing levels of attention [120, 121] . There are a number of different types of health information technology-related errors, including occurrences resulting from equipment malfunction, incorrect usage, lost data, or unavailable equipment (downtime) [122] . In aggregate, these errors or any resulting clinical decisions could lead to significant patient harm. Having redundant hardware in place for essential patient care activities, improving data displays and user interface, and implementing robust training programs and prerelease testing are just some of the many ways we can reduce the number of health information technology-related errors [122] .
Important ways to eliminate human error in medicine are safety checklists and standardized handoffs. A systematic review of safety checklists showed that operating room teamwork and communication greatly benefited from the introduction of these simple tools [123] . Checklists were thought to improve outcomes by opening pre-procedure communication, urging dissemination of valuable case-related materials, promoting teamwork and decision-making, highlighting knowledge gaps, and cultivating camaraderie [123] . The Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation (SBAR) handoff tool was created to enhance communication ( Table 1) . Through systemization of communication, healthcare teams have a shared expectation of what information is being exchanged and how it is organized. Implementation of the communication tool in the clinical setting has been shown to enhance the acceptance of patient safety climate, staff members' perception of communication between one another, as well as the number of incident reports associated with communication errors [100] .
Finally, it must be acknowledged that our understanding of complex human systems continues to be poor at best. Consequently, our ability to reliably and consistently improve team and individual interactions remains severely limited. For example, the assessment of disruptive behavior(s) and their impact on PS is one of the key areas needing urgent attention and highquality research [124, 125] . In the area of ineffective communication, significant amount of descriptive information is available, yet research on how to effectively intervene to improve outcomes in this domain continues to be deficient [126] [127] [128] . Last, but not least, it is critical for us to better understand the relationship between PS and provider quality of life, emotional intelligence, and mindfulness [129, 130] .
Conclusion
As we open the second volume of the Vignettes in Patient Safety, we hope to provide the reader with a compelling argument for continued need for steadfast patient safety advocacy at all levels of our healthcare organizations. Although scenarios presented in this volume may be different from those presented in the first volume, common threads continue to emerge throughout the Vignettes-communication, checklists, teams, standardization, quality improvement, etc. Along those thematic lines, we also compiled a list of some of the most
